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We present two efficient quantum key distribution schemes over two different collective-noise
channels. The accepted hypothesis of collective noise is that photons travel inside a time window
small compared to the variation of noise. Noiseless subspaces are made up of two Bell states and the
spatial degree of freedom is introduced to form two nonorthogonal bases. Although these protocols
resort to entangled states for encoding the key bit, the receiver is only required to perform single-
particle product measurements and there is no basis mismatch. Moreover, the detection is passive
as the receiver does not switch his measurements between two conjugate measurement bases to get
the key.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Pp, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has become one of
the most important branches of quantum information.
The principle of quantum mechanics was introduced into
communication to ensure its security by Bennett and
Brassard (BB84) in 1984 [1], which started the vigorous
development of quantum communication. Different from
classic communication, the security of quantum commu-
nication is based on the laws of physics rather than the
difficulty of computation. The eavesdropper Eve is so
powerful that her ability is only limited by the principles
in quantum mechanics. However, the noncloning theo-
rem forbids Eve to eavesdrop the quantum signals freely
and fully as her action will inevitably disturb the un-
known states and leave a trace in the outcomes obtained
by the two legitimate users. By far, QKD has attracted
the most attention [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
Photons are popular entities for quantum communica-
tion since they are fast, cheap, easy to control and inter-
act weakly with environment. QKD experiments through
free air and optical fibers have been demonstrated over
the past 20 years [11, 12, 13]. It is found in the experi-
mental results that the polarization of photons is incident
to be influenced by the thermal fluctuation, vibration,
and the imperfection of the fiber, which are generally
called noise. Both the inhomogeneity of atmosphere in
a free space and the birefringence in an optical fiber are
obstacles to the application of quantum communication
with photon polarization degrees of freedom. The noise
not only changes the fidelity of quantum states carry-
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ing the information, which will decrease the successful
probability of schemes consequently, but also gives the
eavesdropper a chance to disguise her disturbance with
a better fiber, which will directly impact the key point
of quantum communication, i.e., its security. The most
obvious solution is to continuously estimate the transfor-
mation caused by the noise and compensate for it mo-
mentarily. This can be denoted as a feedback control
project. However, this method is difficult in practice and
it requires an interruption of transmission. If the fluctu-
ation is too fast, the method is invalid.
There are two valid methods to solve this problem:
one is choosing another degree of freedom to encode the
key bits, and the other is first to theorize the noise and
then find a way to remove or decrease the noise effect.
The typical solution of finding a new degree of freedom
is phase coding, which has been demonstrated in opti-
cal fibers experimentally [12]. Although most of the ap-
paratus in the experiment was polarization-dependent,
while the polarization of the photon would be influenced
by the birefringence effect, the Faraday orthoconjuga-
tion effect [14] was proposed to circumvent this problem.
However, the phase-based schemes require complex in-
terferometers and high precision timing. Moreover, some
phase coding protocols are two-way communications that
are susceptive to Trojan horse attack [5, 15]. The second
method is first constructing an appropriate noise model,
and then finding a resolvent accordingly, such as quan-
tum error correct code (QECC)[16], single-photon error
rejection [17, 18], quantum error-rejection code with two
qubits [19, 20, 21], and decoherence-free subspace (DFS)
[22, 23, 24]. The QECC encodes one logical bit into sev-
eral physical qubits according to the type of noise, and
then the users measure the stabilizer codes to detect er-
rors and correct them. For single-photon error rejection
schemes and protocols utilizing the idea of DFS, there is
2an important precondition called as the collective noise
assumption [25]. That is, the photons travel inside a
time window that is shorter than the variation of noise.
In other words, if several qubits transmit through the
noise channel simultaneously or they are close to each
other spatially, the transformation of the noise on each
of the qubits is identical.
The single-photon error rejection schemes transmit
photons faithfully without ancillary qubits through a col-
lective noise channel. The two parts of the photon split
by a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) are adjusted to have
a time delay, and then they suffer from the same noise
consecutively. The effect of noise is cancelled by select-
ing the final state arriving at a special time slot. In other
words, the state collapses into a subspace that is not im-
pacted by the noise with a certain probability. Kalamidas
proposed a single-photon error rejection protocol in 2005
[17], which is efficient and convenient except for the use
of Pockels cells (PC). Recently, we presented a single-
photon transmission scheme with linear optics against
collective noise [18], in which only passive linear optical
elements are required. In a sense, the schemes using only
single-photon states to reject errors can be regarded as a
kind of DFS scheme in which the time degree of freedom
is introduced to form the DFS with the two polarization
parts.
The DFS can be made up of several qubits which expe-
rience the same noise and compensate the effect of noise
to implement a fault-tolerance communication. Walton
et al proposed a QKD scheme using the idea of DFS in
2003 [22]. In their scheme, the logical qubit is encoded
into two time-bin qubits to protect the quantum system
against a collective-dephasing noise. The Hilbert space
is extended by the time degree of freedom, so that the re-
ceiver could perform his measurement with a fixed basis.
Later, Boileau et al. presented a QKD protocol with a
collective random unitary error model by using the linear
combinations of two singlet states |ψ−〉, which are invari-
ant under whatever rotations [23]. The spatial degree of
freedom is also introduced to distinguish the states. How-
ever, the receiver has to discard half of the samples due
to the inconclusive results, similar to traditional QKD
protocols such as BB84 QKD protocol in which the two
legitimate users abandon half of the outcomes owing to
wrong measurement bases. Recently, Wang proposed a
robust QKD using a subspace of two-qubit states [24].
The states being transformed out of the subspace by the
collective rotation are rejected by a parity check and then
the total error rate in the QKD protocol decreases.
In this paper, we present two fault-tolerant quantum
key distribution schemes against collective noises. One is
used against a collective-dephasing noise and the other
is used against a collective-rotation noise. The DFS is
spanned by two entangled states, and the spatial and
polarization degrees of freedom are both introduced. The
receiver uses passive detection, i.e., he is not required to
switch between conjugate measurements, to obtain the
related outcomes. The most important merit of these two
schemes is that there is no basis mismatch, which means
there is no abandonment of samples owing to wrong basis
measurement in these two schemes.
II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION AGAINST
A COLLECTIVE NOISE
We select special Bell states according to the form of
noise to build blocks for constructing a decoherence-free
subspace. The key bits are encoded on the states and the
relative order of the photon pairs.
A. QKD against a collective-dephasing noise
A collective-dephasing noise can be described as
U |0〉 = |0〉, U |1〉 = eiφ|1〉, (1)
where φ is the parameter of the noise and it fluctuates
with time. Generally, the logical qubit encoded into two
physical qubit product states in the following is immune
to this collective-dephasing noise as the two logical qubits
acquire the same phase factor eiφ,
|0〉L = |01〉, |1〉L = |10〉, (2)
where the subscript L represents the logical bit, and |0〉
and |1〉 represent the horizontal polarization state and
the vertical one, respectively, which are the two eigen-
states of Pauli operator σz (Z basis). We choose two
superpositions of these two logical bits to form a DFS.
They are two antiparallel Bell states written as
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉), (3)
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉). (4)
Generally speaking, a secure QKD protocol needs at
least two nonorthogonal measuring bases. The eaves-
dropper cannot obtain the information directly and will
disturb the quantum state without the knowledge of its
basis information. However, the use of two nonorthog-
onal bases results in the abandonment of half instances
measured by the receiver with wrong bases, or calls for
the technique of quantum storage, which is difficult at
present. For constructing an efficient QKD protocol,
we pack two two-particle entangled states as one group
and introduce the spatial degree of freedom to form the
nonorthogonality. The spatial degree of freedom means
the relative orders of the four particles. Two permuta-
tions are used to form the two spatial bases to prepare
the quantum states, shown in Fig 1. There are the neigh-
boring basis |Ψ〉 in which the two entangled particles are
in proximity and the crossing basis |Φ〉 in which particles
of the two entangled states are ranged alternately.
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FIG. 1: Schematics of the two spatial bases. Lines represent
the entanglement between particles.
The four states with which we encode the logical bits
can be written as
Ψdp0 = |ψ+〉12 ⊗ |ψ+〉34, (5)
Ψdp1 = |ψ−〉12 ⊗ |ψ−〉34, (6)
Φdp0 = |ψ+〉13 ⊗ |ψ+〉24, (7)
Φdp1 = |ψ−〉13 ⊗ |ψ−〉24. (8)
Here the subscripts 0 and 1 on the left side represent the
key bits encoded, and subscripts {1, 2, 3, 4} on the right
side denote the sequence of these four particles on the line
of transmission. We can distinguish them by their time
of arrival. Under the assumption of collective noise, the
interval between the first and the fourth photons should
be shorter than the fluctuation time of the noise param-
eter φ, which ensures that these four photons suffer from
the same noise.
These four states in terms of the X basis | ± x〉 are
shown below, where | ± x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉) are the two
eigenstate of the Pauli operator σx. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we use |±〉 representing | ± x〉 in the following:
Ψdp0 = a+ b, (9)
Ψdp1 = c− d, (10)
Φdp0 = a+ c, (11)
Φdp1 = b− d, (12)
where
a =
1
2
(|++++〉+ | − − −−〉)1234, (13)
b =
1
2
(|++−−〉+ | − − ++〉)1234, (14)
c =
1
2
(|+−+−〉+ | −+ −+〉)1234, (15)
d =
1
2
(|+−−+〉+ | −+ +−〉)1234. (16)
It is not difficult to verify that 〈Ψdp0 |Ψdp1 〉 =
0, 〈Φdp0 |Φdp1 〉 = 0 and 〈Φdpi |Ψdpi 〉 = 12 (i = 0, 1). For
each basis Ψdp and Φdp, the receiver can distinguish the
two states in a deterministic way with four single-particle
measurements.
Now, let us describe the QKD scheme in detail as fol-
lows:
(S1) The sender Alice chooses a random (n + 2δ) bit
string K and a random (n+ 2δ) bit string B.
(S2) Alice encodes each bit of the key string K ac-
cording to {|Ψdp0 〉, |Ψdp1 〉} if the corresponding bit in the
basis string B is 0, or encodes into {|Φdp0 〉, |Φdp1 〉} if the
corresponding bit in B is 1.
(S3) Alice sends the (n+2δ) four-particle states to the
receiver Bob.
(S4) Bob performs the single-particle product measure-
ments on each quartet after the receipt subsequently. He
selects randomly 2δ states from the sequence for eaves-
dropping check, where δ states are measured with the Z
basis and the other δ samples are measured in X basis.
The residual n samples used to share the secret key are
measured in X basis. Bob records all of the measurement
results.
(S5) Bob tells Alice the positions of groups chosen for
eavesdropping check and asks Alice for the initial states
of these samples. After receipt of these message, Bob
checks the security of the transmission by estimating the
error rate. If the error rate is acceptable, they continue
to the next step. Otherwise, they abort the protocol.
(S6) After they affirm the security of the transmission,
Alice announces B, with which Bob can determine the
key bits. These results are taken as a raw key string.
Error correction and privacy amplification are required
to obtain the final key.
Except for the samples used for the security analysis
with the Z basis measurements, all the other photons are
measured with the X basis. That means the receiver is
not required to switch between conjugate measurement
bases to get the message. And this scheme is efficient
as with Alice’s information of the basis, all the instances
are used to generate the key, not just 1/4 of those in the
QKD scheme against a collective-dephasing noise shown
in Ref. [22]. Moreover, it does not require the receiver
Bob to measure his photons with joint two-photon mea-
surements, different from that in Ref. [22].
B. QKD against a collective-rotation noise
Another common noise model called collective unitary
rotation noise satisfies
Ur|0〉 = cosθ|0〉+ sinθ|1〉
Ur|1〉 = −sinθ|0〉+ cosθ|1〉. (17)
The parameter θ depends on the noise in the quantum
channel and fluctuates with time. With such a type of
collective errors, we choose |ψ−〉 and |φ+〉 to form the
DFS, where
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). (18)
They are invariant under this type of rotation. Similar
to the method used above, we pack two entangled states
4as one group. Four combinations to code the key bits are
Ψr0 = |φ+〉12 ⊗ |φ+〉34 = e+ f, (19)
Ψr1 = |ψ−〉12 ⊗ |ψ−〉34 = g − h, (20)
Φr0 = |φ+〉13 ⊗ |φ+〉24 = e+ g, (21)
Φr1 = |ψ−〉13 ⊗ |ψ−〉24 = f − h, (22)
where
e =
1
2
(|0000〉+ |1111〉)1234, (23)
f =
1
2
(|0011〉+ |1100〉)1234, (24)
g =
1
2
(|0101〉+ |1010〉)1234, (25)
h =
1
2
(|0110〉+ |1001〉)1234. (26)
It is easy to find that the superposition terms of
{Φr0,Φr1,Ψr0,Ψr1} on the Z basis is similar to those of
{Φdp0 ,Φdp1 ,Ψdp0 ,Ψdp1 } on the X basis. In this QKD proto-
col, the sender Alice prepares a sequence of quartet states
randomly in Ψr0(Φ
r
0) or Ψ
r
1(Φ
r
1) to denote the key bit 0
or 1. The choice of the basis for each state is stochas-
tic. Then she sends the sequence to Bob. Bob chooses a
sufficiently large subset of the multiplets as the checking
samples and measures them with the measuring bases X
and Z randomly. The other groups of states are measured
with Z basis. Bob records all of the measurement results
and tells Alice the positions of checking samples he se-
lected. With Alice’s information of the original states
of these checking samples, Bob analyzes the error rate.
If the error rate is reasonably low, they determine the
channel is secure. Otherwise, they abandon their mea-
surement results and repeat the communication from the
beginning. After ensuring the security of transmission,
Alice tells Bob the spatial bases she used to produce the
quartets, with which Bob can deduce the key sequence
from his measurement outcomes.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
For one-way quantum communication, there are two
main means of eavesdropping. one is the intercept and
resend attack [15] and the other is that using an auxiliary
particle to interact with the particles carrying messages
and measuring the auxiliary photon to get some useful
information. The interaction can be two-particle unitary
operation or controlled-not (CNOT) gate [16]. For sim-
plicity, we denote the eavesdropping check by measuring
samples with the X(Z) basis as the X(Z) check in the
following.
Considering the first QKD scheme against a dephasing
noise, as key bits are encoded into four-particle entangled
states, the direct eavesdropping done by the eavesdrop-
per Eve is the intercept-measure-resend attack. There
are two kinds of measurements: the single-particle prod-
uct measurements and the Bell-basis measurements. For
this scheme, the receiver Bob can obtain the message
only in the X basis. If her measurement outcome is a
decomposition of a (d), Eve concludes that the key bit
is 0 (1) directly. For other results, Eve cannot get the
key until Alice publishes the information of spatial bases,
Ψdp or Φdp. If she resends a fake state(one of the four
states, a, b, c, d) to Bob according to her measurement
results, the error rate in X check is eX = 0 and the
error rate in Z check is eZ =50%. So the average er-
ror rate is eA =25%. There is another way to resend
the fake state. The eavesdropper Eve guesses the origi-
nal states according to her results and resends entangled
fake states. From Eqs. (5)-(8), one can see that Eve will
get a wrong state with half opportunity, which will be
discovered with probability 25% both in X check and Z
check. The average error rate of resending a guess state
is 25%. The calculation of the error rate when Eve is
measuring in the Bell basis is a little complex because of
the quantum entanglement swapping phenomenon [26].
There is a half opportunity for Eve to choose the correct
spatial basis. For a wrong basis, Eve can detect her mis-
take with 50% due to the appearance of |φ±〉 as results
of entanglement swapping and then change the basis to
prepare a fake state. This method will cause a 25% error
rate in X check and 12.5% in Z check, while the aver-
age error rate is 19.25%. It is important to point out
that with Bell-state measurements, Eve cannot get the
key message until the bases are published by Alice. The
error rates of some eavesdropping are shown in Table I.
From Eqs. (5)-(16), we find the parity of two parti-
cles in the X basis can reveal the key bit. For example,
photons 3 and 4 are parallel in |Ψdp0 〉 and antiparallel in
|Ψdp1 〉. Photons 2 and 4 are parallel in |Φdp0 〉 and antipar-
allel in |Φdp1 〉. The eavesdropper can utilize an auxiliary
photon prepared in |+〉5 to get the key message by means
of two CNOT operators C35 and C45 along the x direc-
tion, where Cij means using particle i as control bit and
j as target bit. After the two CNOT gates, Eve measures
photon 5 in the X basis. The outcome |+〉(|−〉) means
the two photons 3 and 4 are parallel (antiparallel) and
the key bit is 0 (1). If Eve guesses the right spatial bases
|Ψdp〉 or |Φdp〉, her action will not be detected and she
can get the key bit with the basis information. Other-
wise, this method will introduce a 50% error rate in Z
check.
TABLE I: The relation between the error rate and the eaves-
dropping attack on the QKD protocol against the dephasing
noise.
dephasing noise eX eZ eA
MB: X, resend: product state 0 50% 25%
MB: X, resend: entangled state 25% 25% 25%
MB: Bell, resend: entangled state 25% 12.5% 19.25%
CNOT on auxiliary on X basis 0 25% 12.5%
For the second QKD scheme, the calculation of error
rates for different attacks is similar to the first one. A lit-
5TABLE II: The relation between the error rate and the eaves-
dropping attack on the QKD protocol against the rotation of
polarization .
polarization rotation eX eZ eA
MB: X, resend: product state 0 50% 25%
MB: X, resend: entangled state 25% 25% 25%
MB: Z, resend: product state 50% 0 25%
MB: Z, resend: entangled state 25% 25% 25%
MB: Bell, resend: entangled state 25% 25% 25%
CNOT on auxiliary on Z basis 25% 0 12.5%
tle difference is caused by the fact that the states used in
the second protocol are symmetry in the two measuring
bases (MBs) X and Z. The error rates are listed in Table
II. From these two tables, we find that the eavesdropper
will introduce at least 12.5% error inevitably when she
tries to wiretap. She will be detected by the two legit-
imate users. Eve can get half of the key bits both by
X measurement and Z measurement with disturbing the
unknown quantum states, but Alice will announce the
preparation bases after the security check and the key bit
will be used to encrypt secret message after they confirm
its security. So this QKD protocol is secure in principle.
IV. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
Compared with the QKD scheme in Ref. [22], our first
QKD scheme over a collective-dephasing noise channel
has the advantage of having a higher intrinsic efficiency
[30] as that in the former is 1/4 and almost all the in-
stances in our scheme can be used to distill the private
key. Moreover, this scheme requires the receiver Bob only
to perform single-photon measurements for obtaining the
outcomes used for distilling the private key and does not
require him to switch the choice of the measuring bases,
which will make the measurement simpler than that in
Ref. [22]. On the other hand, in order to encode the
states Ψdp and Φdp, the sender Alice needs to possess
some modulators for spatial modes, which will increase
the difficulty of the preparation of the logical qubit states.
At present, Alice can exploit the similar apparatus com-
posed of optical delays and switches in Ref. [7] to adjust
the states Ψdp and Φdp. Also, Alice should prepare two
EPR pairs for each logical states. Although this task can
be accomplished at present by sending a pump pulse of
ultraviolet light back and forth across a beta barium bo-
rate crystal [27, 28], it is not in a practical application
extensively.
Our second QKD scheme against a collective-rotation
noise has a higher intrinsic efficiency than that in the ro-
bust polarization-based QKD scheme [23] as almost all
the instances in our scheme can be used to create the pri-
vate key and about 1/4 of the instances in the latter are
useful (it can be improved to be 1/2 if the proportion of
the samples exploited by the two parties to analyze the
security of the quantum channel to all the instances ob-
tained is small). As the symmetry of the encoding states
shown in Eqs. (19)-(22), we get a scheme quite similar to
a BB84 QKD protocol [1] with four-dimensional quantum
systems. However, the scheme introduced in Ref. [23] is
more similar to the B92 QKD protocol [2]. Through a
channel with loss, our QKD scheme may be more secure
than that in Ref. [23].
The idea of using only a fewX bases to check the eaves-
dropping was proposed ten years ago [29]. Its main aim is
to reduce the fraction of discarded data caused by wrong
basis measurement. There are some differences between
it and our schemes. First, in Ref. [29] a predominant
basis is used to prepare and measure the states, but in
ours a predominant basis is only used to distill the key
bits. That is, states transmitting in the quantum channel
are completely random in the four states in our schemes,
so that a refined analysis of error rate was required to
prevent the eavesdropper from getting information using
the predominant basis in the former, while the error rate
analysis of ours is similar to the BB84 QKD protocol,
as is the security. Second, the samples for eavesdrop-
ping check are chosen by Bob, which makes the process
efficient as each one selected is useful.
In summary, we propose two QKD schemes to share
a sequence of key with two different kinds of collective-
noise channels. The interference and two-way quantum
communication is not required to solve the problem of
collective noises. Despite a little difference in measuring
basis and the states used to encode the logical bits, the
essence of these two schemes is quite similar. That is, the
legitimate user utilizes the special Bell states which are
invariant under the given noise model to protect the sys-
tem against the noise and introduces the spatial degree of
freedom to form two nonorthogonal bases with which the
key rate is increased compared to protocols abandoning
half instances due to wrong measuring bases. There are
several remarkable advantages in our two schemes. First,
the samples for security check are not asked to be mea-
sured with an entangled basis. The samples are chosen
randomly by the receiver Bob which is easier, compared
with the QKD schemes with a decoy state, in which the
sender Alice inserts her decoy state into the massage se-
quence and tells Bob the positions after the transmission.
Second, it is unnecessary for the two parties to discard
samples. Except for eavesdropping check, almost all of
the states transmitted are used to share the private key.
Moreover, although the logical bits are encoded into en-
tangled states, the receiver only needs to perform single-
particle product measurements on his photons, not joint
two-particle Bell-state measurements. Except for the re-
quirement of two nonorthogonal bases measurement for
eavesdropping check, Bob need not switch his two con-
jugate bases to obtain the key. Only passive detection is
enough to get the message.
Schemes using several physical bits to present one logi-
cal bit are fragile with photon loss and hence the commu-
nication distance is restricted. This is a tradeoff between
6the transmission distance and the degree of fault toler-
ance. More research and development of technique are
expected to solve this problem in the future.
Note added As the parity of the state of two EPR
pairs transmitted as a group can be detected with
controlled-not operations and an auxiliary particle, with-
out disturbing the quantum system, the two parties Alice
and Bob can only exploit each two EPR pairs to carry one
bit of information securly over a collective-noise chan-
nel. In the same way, the two parties in Ref. [7] should
at least distill one bit of information about the parity
of each group of EPR pairs with privacy amplification;
otherwise, the eavesdropper Eve can obtain one bit of
information for each group of EPR pairs freely. With in-
creasing of the number of the EPR pairs in each group
in Ref. [7], the information leaked becomes less as each
EPR pair carries two bits of information in Ref. [7].
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